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Abstract
We examine whether easy and early access to old-age benefits induce older workers
to become inactive. We use Polish LFS data. We find added worker effect prevailing
over discouraged worker effect. The latter arises after a few quarters and is asymmetric.
Females permanently leave the workforce. More males leave the workforce in
contractions than re-enter in expansions. If old-age benefit becomes the main source
of income, the worker (after 1 year) is 8 to 20 times more likely to exit the market than
unemployment or social welfare beneficiaries. Our findings support higher retirement
age—the age when workers become eligible for old-age benefits.
JEL classification: J14, J22
Keywords: Old-age benefits, Discouraged workers, Discouraged worker effect, Exits
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1 Introduction
We ask the following question: to what extent does easy and early access to old-age
benefits contribute to the low participation rates of older workers? We examine this
question in the framework of work discouragement. We hypothesise that easy and
early access to old-age benefits demotivates workers, if they are not yet at the age when
they are incapable of earning on their own. This statement is strong and ignores the
social perspective. However, if we assume that workers start receiving old-age benefits
earlier than when they are no longer able to earn on their own, we neglect the interests
of younger workers whose remuneration has to finance this policy (Góra 2013).
A few factors affect the early exit from the labour market of older workers. Labour mar-
ket institutions are designed in terms of age limits. To retire at 65 today is different from
doing so a century ago. Employers use retirement as a cheap and easy means of restruc-
turing staff and view it as a subsidy, but workers also retire voluntarily. Politicians eagerly
modify the retirement age, although today considerably less due to budgetary problems.
Thanks to the “lump of labour fallacy”, people perceive the number of jobs as fixed, so re-
tirement of the older workers should improve the situation of younger workers (Saint-
Paul 2004). Workers encounter incentives to retire earlier rather than later. In many de-
veloped countries, social security provisions impose heavy taxes on work incomes beyond
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the earliest retirement age (Gruber and Wise 1999). Workers who retire earlier rather
than later perceive it as a way of escaping the income-leisure trade-off.
We focus on the demotivation effect of old-age benefits only and analyse it in the
light of the discouraged worker effect. The discouraged workers are persons who have
demonstrated some labour force attachment, i.e. they are willing to work and ready to
work and have been looking for a job within the previous 12 months, but not in the
previous 4 weeks due to certain reasons. If these reasons are job market related,
workers enter or exit the market. Thus, the participation rates1 are pro-cyclical2 with
respect to GDP or counter-cyclical with respect to the unemployment rate. On the con-
trary, the added worker effect causes an increase in the participation in response to a
partner’s job loss. Then, the participation rates behave inversely. Changes in the partici-
pation rates have been studied in macroeconomic analyses. Benitez-Silva (2002) found
that older persons more often remained active in the labour market beyond the traditional
retirement age. They actively sought work, both on the job and when not employed, but
their behaviour depended on the previous work attachment and health conditions. Darby
et al. (1998) and O’Brien (2011) analysed cyclical properties of the participation rates.
Darby et al. (1998) found that the discouraged worker effect was especially common
among females aged 45–54. O’Brien (2011) proved3 that the business cycle affected the
participation rates of older males. In both articles, the effect was asymmetric. A cyclical
downturn influenced participation rates more than an expansion. Thus, the decrease in
participation during a recession was higher than the increase during a boom. Maestas and
Li (2006) analysed the search behaviour of older not employed workers and reported rela-
tively low transition rates. Only half of the older job seekers found work, while 13% were
discouraged4. The rest experienced health or income shocks, they made little job search
effort or their reservation wages were relatively high.
In a microeconomic perspective, research has identified determinants of the workers’
labour market status. van Ham et al. (2001) looked for discouragement at two stages of
the search and matching process. Discouragement could arise when an individual chose
inactivity to evade unemployment. The second option was when workers with lower
employability sought work less intensively, so the search intensity distinguished them.
We believe that the availability of old-age benefits affects the job search behaviour
and results in premature labour force withdrawal. If a person receives an old-age bene-
fit or perceives it as a forthcoming income option, she can become discouraged from
active job search. We focus on the outflow from unemployment to inactivity to check if
the discouragement affects unemployed older workers who (soon) decide on retire-
ment. As we analyse the older workers’ behaviour just prior to potential retirement, we
do not examine the pure discouraged worker effect. Instead, we extend the traditional
definition to look at premature withdrawals from the labour market.
We base our analysis on the Polish labour market. This choice stems from a number
of reasons. Participation rates among persons aged 55+ in Poland are on average low
compared to demographic characteristics observed in Europe in the twenty-first century.5
In Poland, there is a so-called minimum retirement age.6 It is the earliest age at which a
worker can retire. Employers may not lay off workers when they reach the retirement age.
A worker may sue an employer for being fired above the minimum retirement age.7 The
present value of paid contributions and the age at which the retiree starts receiving the
payment determine the value of the old-age benefits. This amount reduces or even negates
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the level of tax on continued work. These regulations were implemented with the pension
reform of 1999. However, the effective phasing of them started in 2009. Thus, these legal
conditions have just begun to affect the situation in the Polish labour market.8 They have
not become strong factors behind retirement decisions yet, but data show a recent in-
crease in participation rates and the actual retirement age in Poland (see Eurostat).9 How-
ever, for our analysis, a legacy of the previous arrangements strongly matters. Until the
new pension system was introduced (1999), it had been relatively easy to retire early in
Poland. Average actual retirement age in the mid-1990s was roughly 55 years for women
and 59 for men—irrespective to its formal level being 60/65.10 Although early retirement
schemes are much less available now, some occupational groups (miners, uniform ser-
vices, judges and prosecutors) can still enjoy them. The other groups in certain cases can
apply for the so-called pre-retirement benefit (a kind of open-ended unemployment bene-
fit that does not require any job search). The 2008 withdrawal of the early retirement
schemes was made less drastic through implementation of bridging pensions that are tem-
poral, difficult to obtain, not very generous and paid by employers. This has strongly re-
duced availability of early retirement for the future, but this did not wipe out the effects of
previous arrangements, namely workers prematurely leaving the labour market.
In Section 2, we present macro analysis of the discouraged worker effect and demon-
strate cross-correlations between the cyclical components of the analysed variables and
the selected macroeconomic indicators. Looking for asymmetry in the duration or size
of the discouraged worker effect, we examine the relationship between the participation
rate or the discouraged worker rate and the unemployment rate. In a microeconomic per-
spective (Section 3), we approximate the discouraged worker effect by the outflow from
unemployment to inactivity and identify factors that entice older workers to withdraw
from the job search. We focus on the roles of old-age benefits and the business cycle. In
Section 4, we discuss the results, and in Section 5, we present our conclusions.
We primarily contribute to the literature by analysing the impact of the availability of
old-age benefits on the participation of older workers. We check if these benefits tempt
workers to exit from the labour force. These benefits may demotivate workers from fur-
ther job search activity, causing low participation rates. Thus, we extend the definition
of the discouraged worker effect and do not refer to pure cyclicality of the labour force
participation. In macroeconomic perspective, we seek for the asymmetry in the size
and duration of the effect. We find a time-varying discouraged worker effect. The
added worker effect prevails at first. Then, the discouraged worker effect arises. It is
asymmetric in intensity (stronger in recessions than expansions) and length (certain
workers leave the workforce permanently). In a microeconomic perspective, females
and older workers are more likely to quit the labour market. The availability of old-age
benefits multiplies the probability of withdrawal from the labour market. We perceive
our findings as an argument to increase the retirement age, which we understand as
the age of the availability of the old-age benefits.
2 Discouraged workers from a macroeconomic perspective
We analysed the population in Poland aged 50+. The share of this group in the total
population increased by 11 percentage points to 36% between 1995 and 2014, and it is
expected to increase further. At the same time, the life expectancy for a 45-year-old
person11 increased by around 4 years for males and females, and it is also expected to
Gałecka-Burdziak and Góra IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2016) 5:18 Page 3 of 18
increase further. Older workers experience low unemployment rate but seek work lon-
ger. The average unemployment rate for workers 50+ between 1995 and 2014 was 8%,
but it did not exceed 7.5% since 2007. Between 2007 and 2014, older workers (females
aged 45–59 and males aged 45–64) sought work on average almost 3 months longer
than the total average, although the difference decreased to 1.5 months since 2010.
Older workers demonstrated relatively low attachment to the labour market. The
pension reform, mentioned in the introduction, was implemented in 1999, but its im-
pact started to be visible at the end of the 2000s. The labour force participation and the
employment rate did not exceed 35% between 1995 and 2014, but they increased since
2006. The mean age of new old-age pensioners also increased. The available data
showed that between 2011 and 2014 this average age increased by 0.6 years to 60.4.
The availability of old-age pensions seemed to be an important determinant of the
labour force participation. Between 1995 and 2014, the number of persons who justified
their inactivity due to retirement increased by 83%. In 2013, around 3% of those 50+
indicated that retirement was the main reason they did not seek employment. Reaching
the eligibility age for the old-age benefits had been the main reason for quitting work12
for 57.5% of those aged 50–69 who were inactive and were receiving old-age benefits
(Labour Force Survey (LFS) data for 2012). Simultaneously, 50% of those receiving old-
age benefits and continuing work did so primarily to provide sufficient personal/
household income (LFS data for 2012).
From an aggregate perspective, we used data on the participation rates and discour-
aged worker rates13 in the period 2000–2013. We focused on the following age groups:
males aged 45–64 or 45+ and females aged 45–59 or 45+. The lower bound of the age
limits reflected the age groups provided in the aggregate LFS time series. The upper
bounds (59 or 64) reflected the minimum14 retirement age. Macroeconomic indicators
used for reference included gross domestic product (GDP in PLN millions, chain-
linked volumes, reference year 2005) and unemployment rates.
Table 9 in the Appendix contains the summary statistics for the selected variables.
The average participation rate for males aged 45–64 equalled 0.662 ± 0.014 and
decreased to 0.495 ± 0.008 for those 45+. For females aged 45–59, the average partici-
pation rate equalled 0.604 ± 0.036 and decreased to 0.331 ± 0.011 for those 45+. Dis-
couraged worker rates were higher for the subsample of the working age population,
0.024 and 0.018 for males, and 0.037 and 0.034 for females. All series displayed a high
degree of persistence. Monthly autocorrelation coefficients were higher for the par-
ticipation rates than for the discouraged worker rates. We used ADF, KPSS and
Phillips-Perron tests to check for the unit root and stationarity in the data (Table 1).
We inferred that time series were I(1).
We examined the relationship between the participation rates, discouraged worker rates
and the variables that describe the macroeconomic situation. We applied a high-pass
Hodrick-Prescott filter and computed the correlation coefficients between the cyclical
components of the particular series (see Table 2). Statistically significant results indicated
counter-cyclical female participation rates and male discouraged worker rates with respect
to the GDP and pro-cyclical with respect to the unemployment rate. We broadened the
findings when we looked at lags. Statistically significant correlation coefficients of the ex-
pected sign (i.e. in line with the discouraged worker effect) were between the following
(Table 10 in the Appendix): (i) female participation rates and GDP lagged by 10 periods
Gałecka-Burdziak and Góra IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2016) 5:18 Page 4 of 18
or more, (ii) female participation rates and unemployment rate lagged by 7 periods or
more, (iii) male discouraged worker rates and GDP lagged by 2 periods or more, (iv) 45+
female discouraged worker rate and GDP lagged by 9 periods or more, (v) male discour-
aged worker rates and unemployment rate lagged by 2 periods or more and (vi) 45+
female discouraged worker rate and unemployment rate lagged by 5 periods or more.




Male participation rate 45–64 −7.760 −7.760 0.126
Male participation rate 45+ −6.422 −6.453 0.077
Female participation rate 45–59 −5.546 −5.704 0.606
Female participation rate 45+ −7.980 −8.044 0.208
Male discouraged worker rate 45–64 −7.729 −7.857 0.076
Male discouraged worker rate 45+ −8.141 −8.361 0.091
Female discouraged worker rate 45–59 −6.754 −6.754 0.068
Female discouraged worker rate 45+ −6.491 −6.491 0.084
GDP −5.533a −3.129 0.171
Unemployment rate −2.131 −3.989 0.167
I(0) vs. I(1)
Male participation rate 45–64 −0.260 −0.217 0.868
Male participation rate 45+ −0.956 −1.294 0.618
Female participation rate 45–59 1.031 0.449 0.384
Female participation rate 45+ −1.688 −1.613 0.217
Male discouraged worker rate 45–64 −2.524 −2.524 0.148
Male discouraged worker rate 45+ −2.682 −2.696 0.141
Female discouraged worker rate 45–59 −1.709 −1.773 0.578
Female discouraged worker rate 45+ −1.595 −1.702 0.385
GDP 0.538 0.280 0.895
Unemployment rate −1.320 −0.829 0.661
The tests for hypothesis I(0) vs. I(1) include the intercept in the test equation. The ADF and Phillips-Perron tests for
hypothesis I(1) vs. I(2) assume no constant in the test equation. The KPSS test for hypothesis I(1) vs. I(2) includes the
intercept in the test equation
aThe test equation includes the intercept
Source: authors’ calculations; data sources: LFS and Central Statistical Office Poland
Table 2 Correlation coefficients between cyclical components of male and female participation
rates, male and female discouraged workers rates, GDP and unemployment rate computed on the
basis of the HP filter estimates
Variable Hodrick-Prescott filter
GDP Unemployment rate
Male participation rate 45–64 −0.079 0.048
Male participation rate 45+ 0.190 0.031
Female participation rate 45–59 −0.364c 0.545c
Female participation rate 45+ −0.207 0.491c
Male discouraged worker rate 45–64 −0.305b 0.251a
Male discouraged worker rate 45+ −0.327b 0.270b
Female discouraged worker rate 45–59 −0.122 0.091
Female discouraged worker rate 45+ −0.174 0.134
aSignificant at the 10% level; bsignificant at the 5% level; csignificant at the 1% level
Source: authors’ calculations; data sources: LFS and Central Statistical Office Poland
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We sought the relationship between either the participation rate or discouraged
worker rate and the macroeconomic indicator. We searched for the long-term relation-
ship and tested for potential asymmetry in the adjustment process. We found two inter-
esting results (see Table 3). The first equation described how the female participation rate
(for females 45+) depended on the unemployment rate (lagged by 10 periods).
female activity ratet for females 45þð Þ ¼ α0 þ α1 unemployment ratet−10 þ εt
The second equation displayed how the unemployment rate (for males 45+ lagged by
five periods) affected the male discouraged worker rate (for 45+ males).
male discouraged worker ratet for males 45þð Þ
¼ α0 þ α1 unemployment rate for males 45þð Þt−5 þ εt
The equations revealed stable long-term relationships. In both specifications, the re-
siduals suffered from autocorrelation, but once we added the AR(1) term, the results
remained virtually unchanged.15 The models approached a new equilibrium within four
or two quarters, respectively. The coefficients of the positive and negative correction
terms differed. In the female participation equation, the ε^þt coefficient was not statisti-
cally different from zero. The ε^−t−1 coefficient proved this equation returned to equilib-
rium within 2.5 quarters after the negative shock. The Wald test statistics confirmed
that these coefficients differed. We did not find statistically significant asymmetry in
the duration of the effect in the male discouraged worker rate equation.
Another equation for females allowed for asymmetry in the short- and long term sim-
ultaneously and produced more detailed results. Regular ECM estimates indicated that
changes in the unemployment rate inversely affected the participation rates in the short
term and in the long term. In the long term, we got similar results to the previous ones.
The model quickly returned to a long-term equilibrium after the negative shock, but
once the unemployment rate increased, the changes were very long lasting. In the short
term, the coefficient of the deviation in the unemployment rate implied a one-
directional change in the participation rate. Once we separated positive and negative
deviations in the unemployment rate, the results differed. The negative change in the
unemployment rate entailed a decrease in the participation rate. The positive deviation
demonstrated a statistically insignificant coefficient. The coefficients of the Δunemploy-
ment rate+ and Δunemployment rate− variables differed statistically significantly (based
on Wald test statistics).
We verified the asymmetry in the effect duration for females and estimated the TAR-
ECM and M-TAR ECM specifications (Enders and Granger 1998; Enders and Siklos
2001). We assumed the threshold at the level τ = 0 or estimated it. The M-TAR specifi-
cation with a threshold value −0.0024 produced statistically significant results (see
Table 4). The threshold cointegration t-Max test indicated that variables were not coin-
tegrated, but the alternative test ρ1 = ρ2 = 0 led to a contrary outcome. Enders and Siklos
(2001) proved that the second test can have more power than the first one. The ρ1 = ρ2
hypothesis result implied threshold cointegration. The model returned faster to equilib-
rium after the negative impulse.
Apart from the asymmetry in the length of the adjustment process, we analysed the
asymmetry in the size of the discouraged worker effect over the business cycle. We applied
the solutions proposed by Darby et al. (1998) and O’Brien (2011). The first paper defined
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the dummy variable. It equals one from the period when the cyclical component of GDP
reaches a peak until the trough and zero elsewhere. In our model, the dummy variable co-
efficient was not statistically significant. Thus, the impacts from the cyclical downturn and
the economic recovery on the discouraged worker rate were comparable in size.
Table 3 Female participation rate regressed on the lagged unemployment rate, and male
discouraged worker rate regressed on the lagged male unemployment rate, long-term, ECM and
asymmetric ECM estimate results
Female participation rate (45+) Male discouraged worker rate (45+)









LM (p value) 41.295 (0.00) 14.94 (0.00)
ADF (p value) −2.172 (0.03) −3.290 (0.00)
Error correction model
Δunemployment rate 0.240a 0.100
Δunemployment rate−3 (males 45+) −0.081
a 0.035




LM (p value) 2.281 (0.12) 1.065 (0.35)
ADF (p value) −5.951 (0.00) −6.214 (0.00)
Error correction model—long-term asymmetry
Δunemployment rate 0.324b 0.109
Δunemployment rate−3 (males 45+) −0.077
a 0.036
ε^þt−1 −0.104 0.123 −0.376
a 0.154
ε^−t−1 −0.404




LM (p value) 2.00 (0.15) 0.769 (0.47)
ADF (p value) −7.30 (0.00) −6.352 (0.00)
Wald test long-term asymmetry (p value) 1.71 (0.095) 0.669 (0.51)
Error correction model—short-term and long-term asymmetry
Δunemployment rate+ −0.214 0.238
Δunemployment rate− 0.636b 0.161
Δunemployment rateþ−3 males 45þð Þ −0.068 0.058
Δunemployment rate−−3 males 45þð Þ 0.013 0.233
ε^þt−1 0.108 0.144 −0.263 0.194
ε^−t−1 −0.651




LM (2 lags) (p value) 1.003 (0.38) 0.109 (0.90)
ADF (p value) −6.697 (0.00) −6.792 (0.00)
Wald test short-term asymmetry (p value) −2.514 (0.02) −0.983 (0.33)
Wald test long-term asymmetry (p value) 3.080 (0.00) 1.080 (0.29)
Data seasonally adjusted. Dependent variable: quarterly female participation rate (45+) or male discouraged worker
rate (45+)
asignificant at the 5% level; bsignificant at the 1% level
Source: authors’ calculations; data sources: LFS and Central Statistical Office Poland
Gałecka-Burdziak and Góra IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2016) 5:18 Page 7 of 18
O’Brien (2011) followed Connolly (1997). The framework defines the following variables:
Δunemployment rate+ =Δunemployment rate if Δunemployment rate > 0 and 0
otherwise, Δunemployment rate− =Δunemployment rate if Δunemployment rate < 0
and 0 otherwise.
The two variables produce the cumulated positive and negative changes in the un-
employment rate:
cumulatedþt ¼ cumulatedþt−1 þ Δunemployment rateþt
cumulated−t ¼ cumulated−t−1 þ Δunemployment rate−t
Asymmetry arises when the coefficients of the cumulated responses differ signifi-
cantly. We estimated the equation of the male discouraged worker rate (45+).
Estimation results (Table 5) indicated that the male discouraged worker rate experi-
enced asymmetric responses to the cyclical fluctuations. At a 10% significance level, the
Wald test statistics proved that the increase in the male discouraged worker rate (45+)
in a recession was larger than the decrease during an economic recovery.
Table 4 Results of the threshold cointegration tests for the female participation rate equation





τ 0 −0.0097 0 −0.0024
ρ1 (above threshold) −0.185 −0.086 −0.007 0.005
(0.147) (0.114) (0.123) (0.096)
ρ2 (below threshold) −0.116 −0.359 −0.386b −0.813c
(0.133) (0.214) (0.161) (0.201)
ρ1 = ρ2 0.130 1.257 3.491a 13.461b
t-Max value −0.874 −0.757 −0.058 0.048
ρ1 = ρ2 = 0 1.110 1.706 2.886 8.152a
Standard errors reported in parentheses
aSignificant at the 10% level; bsignificant at the 5% level; csignificant at the 1% level
Source: authors’ calculation; data sources: LFS and Central Statistical Office Poland
Table 5 Model results allowing asymmetry in the male discouraged worker rate equation









ADF (p value) −6.869 (0.00)
Wald test for the asymmetry response (p value) 1.842 (0.07)
Data seasonally adjusted. Dependent variable: quarterly male discouraged worker rate (45+). ρ represents the AR(1)
coefficient in the error term
asignificant at the 5% level; bsignificant at the 1% level
Source: authors’ calculations; data sources: LFS and Central Statistical Office Poland
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3 The impact of old-age benefits on outflow from unemployment to inactivity
By looking at labour force participation, we wanted to identify factors that affected
workers’ withdrawal from the labour market. We broadened the standard definition of
the discouraged worker effect. We wanted to determine to what extent old-age benefits
discouraged workers from active job search. We treated these benefits as an alternative
source of income. They could be already paid out or shortly available to eligible
workers. We focused on the outflow from unemployment to inactivity and approxi-
mated the discouraged worker effect by this outflow. Thus, we did not analyse pure dis-
couraged worker effect. By discouraged workers, in turn, we meant those who had
stopped seeking a job during the 1-year interval.
We based the quantitative analysis on individual annual LFS data for the period 2004–
2010. We referred either to workers aged 50–59 (females) and 50–64 (males) or to
workers aged 50+ (females and males). Alike in the aggregate analysis, the upper bound of
the age limit reflected the minimum retirement age. The whole sample consisted of more
than 5000 individuals, 34% of whom had withdrawn from the job search within the 1-year
interval. If we narrowed the sample to the working age population, 33% of more than
5000 individuals moved from unemployment to inactivity. Males constituted 57% of the
sample. Almost half of the workers had sought work for 13 months or more, and almost
two out of three workers had vocational or primary education. The distribution of either
sex, educational level or duration of unemployment did not significantly differ between
those who moved from unemployment to inactivity or those who remained unemployed.
But the distribution of age (more older workers left the unemployment pool) differed be-
tween those who changed or not their status in the labour market.
We looked in more detail at incomes of older workers. Around 25% of the workers
indicated that old-age benefit was a source of income in t0. Around 12% of the workers
pointed that this benefit was the main source of income, but for “only” 77% of them,
the old-age benefit remained the main source of income in t1. Almost 9% of the workers
indicated that unemployment benefit was the main source of income in t0, and for 10% of
them, the old-age benefit became a main source of income in the following year.
At first, we looked at unemployed individuals who were receiving old-age benefits in
t0 and compared their status after the 1-year interval (Table 6). Females and older
workers were more likely to leave the labour force. Negative deviations in the un-
employment rate led to an increase in the probability of labour market withdrawal.
Next, we checked if workers decided to participate in the market regardless of
whether they were receiving old-age benefits in t0 or not (Table 7). Similar conclusions
arose: females and older workers were more willing to move from unemployment to in-
activity. Negative changes in the unemployment rate made workers more likely to exit
the labour force. If the old-age benefits constituted any source of income in t1, the
workers were more than twice as likely to withdraw from the job search.
Finally, we directly identified the impact of old-age benefits and looked at the workers
who were not receiving any kind of old-age benefits in t0 (Table 8). Females and older
workers were more likely to leave the labour force. A decrease in the unemployment
rate raised the probability of older worker outflows from the market. If the old-age
benefit became a source of income in t1, the workers were 4.7 times more likely to
move from unemployment to inactivity. When we differentiated the main source of in-
come in t1, the workers who received old-age benefits were 8 times more likely to leave
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the workforce than those who received unemployment benefits in t1 and even 20 times
more likely to leave the workforce than those who received social welfare benefits in t1.
We considered employed workers separately. Old-age benefits constituted a source of
income for 15% of the employed workers. For 13% of the employed workers, the old-
age benefits were the main source of income. Around 7% of the employed workers in
t0 moved to inactivity in t1, and 59% of them stated they did not seek work because
they were receiving old-age benefits. Simple logistic regressions proved that workers
were more likely to withdraw from the labour force when they became eligible for old-age
benefits. However, the models experienced poor statistical properties, and we have not
identified any other influential variables that could indicate the discouraged worker effect.
4 Discussion
The results produced some interesting findings. In a macroeconomic perspective, it ap-
pears that the added worker effect prevailed over the discouraged worker effect. The
discouraged worker effect arose with lag. When economic conditions worsened,
workers at first increased their job search activity, most probably to compensate for the
decrease in household income. As time elapsed, they became discouraged with the un-
successful job search and left the labour market. This substantial delay can be partially
explained by the inertia in the labour market and the fact that it takes time until a new
equilibrium is reached.
Table 6 Logistic regression of moving from unemployment to inactivity for workers receiving old-
age benefits in t0
Workers receiving old-age benefits in t0
Odds ratio Standard error Odds ratio Standard error
Age (years)
50–54 1 1
55–59 1.747b 0.268 1.748b 0.267




Females 1.441a 0.211 1.460b 0.198
Δunemployment rate− c 0.827b 0.040 0.866b 0.039
Log likelihood −582.66 −640.32
LR 42.95 (df = 4) 57.99 (df = 5)
p value 0.00 0.00
McFadden’s adj. R2 0.036 0.043
Sensitivity 45.92%d 53.02%e
Specificity 68.46%d 64.86%e
Correctly classified 60.41%d 60.40%e
The sample comprised individuals aged either 50–59 (females) and 50–64 (males) or workers aged 50+; annual data for
the time period 2004–2010. Sample size for the workers aged 50–59 (females) and 50–64 (males)—927 observations; for
the workers aged 50+—1010 observations
asignificant at the 5% level; bsignificant at the 1% level
cRefers to a 1 percentage point change in the negative change in the unemployment rate
dCut-off level in the classification table 0.3571 (based on the share of the outflow in the whole sample)
eCut-off level in the classification table 0.3772 (based on the share of the outflow in the whole sample)
Source: authors’ calculations; data sources: LFS
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ECM estimates yielded comparable conclusions. The discouraged worker effect arose
once we analysed an unemployment rate lagged by 5 to 10 quarters. It is a rather long
lag, but it seems to be characteristic of the Polish labour market. For example, in
2002–2004, Poland experienced jobless growth. In the short term, the added worker ef-
fect prevailed. Once we split the unemployment rate deviations into positive and nega-
tive changes, the negative change in the unemployment rate induced a decrease in the
participation rate. It looks that when it was easier to find a job, some workers became
“less active” and did not take part in the search and matching process.16
We found the discouraged worker effect asymmetric in size and duration. The female
participation rate returned much faster to long-term equilibrium after a negative shock
to the unemployment rate. This means that decreases in the unemployment rate re-
sulted in temporary increases in the participation rate only. On the other hand, once
the unemployment rate increased, females left the market almost permanently. The
findings of the threshold ECM estimates were consistent with the asymmetric ECM re-
sults and reinforced the conclusions. The male discouraged worker rate model pro-
duced asymmetry in the size of the effect. More males decided to leave the market
when it was harder to find a job, compared to the number of those who started actively
seeking a job once employment finding chances improved.
Table 7 Logistic regression of moving from unemployment to inactivity for the workers receiving
or not receiving old-age benefits in t0
Workers receiving or not receiving old-age benefits in t0
Odds ratio Standard error Odds ratio Standard error
Age (years)
50–54 1 1
55–59 2.135a 0.213 2.102a 0.208




Females 1.607a 0.151 1.519a 0.137
Δunemployment rate− b 0.716a 0.023 0.736a 0.023
Old-age benefits as a source of income in t1
No 1 1
Yes 2.285a 0.236 2.284a 0.231
Log likelihood −1471.27 −1539.94
LR 276.51 (df = 5) 296.78 (df = 6)
p value 0.00 0.00
McFadden’s adj. R2 0.082 0.088
Sensitivity 60.47%c 62.27%d
Specificity 66.51%c 65.86%d
Correctly classified 64.76%c 64.79%d
The sample comprised individuals aged either 50–59 (females) and 50–64 (males) or workers aged 50+; annual data for
the period 2004–2010. Sample size for the workers aged 50–59 (females) and 50–64 (females)—2676 observations; for
the workers aged 50+—2769 observations
asignificant at the 1% level
bRefers to a 1 percentage point change in the negative change in the unemployment rate
cCut-off level in the classification table 0.2892 (based on the share of the outflow in the whole sample)
dCut-off level in the classification table 0.2987 (based on the share of the outflow in the whole sample)
Source: authors’ calculations; data sources: LFS
Gałecka-Burdziak and Góra IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2016) 5:18 Page 11 of 18
The logistic regression estimates proved that females and older workers were more
likely to leave the workforce. The outflow from unemployment to inactivity was suscep-
tible to business cycle fluctuations. It appears that negative changes in the unemployment
rate induced workers to leave the labour market. Thus, when the unemployment rate de-
creased and it should be easier to find a job, the workers left the market. This suggests
that older workers were less active in the labour market, which confirms stylized facts.
Our findings proved that the old-age benefits increased the probability of withdrawal
from the labour market. We got this result regardless of whether workers were already
receiving the benefit or were to receive it within a 1-year period. We have found that if
a worker was not receiving the old-age benefit in t0 and the old-age benefit became a
source of income in the following year (t1), then the worker was 4.7 times more likely
to refrain from the job search. If, in turn, a worker was not receiving the old-age benefit
in t0 and the old-age benefit became the main source of income in the following year
(t1), then the worker was 6 times more likely to withdraw from the job search than
Table 8 Logistic regression of moving from unemployment to inactivity for workers not receiving
any kind of old-age benefit in t0
Workers not receiving any kind of old-age benefit in t0
Odds ratio Standard error Odds ratio Standard error
Age (years)
50–54 1 1
55–59 2.607a 0.343 2.106a 0.289
60–64 9.713a 2.952 7.763a 2.387
Sex
Males 1 1
Females 1.733a 0.216 1.816a 0.235
Δunemployment rate− b 0.696a 0.029 0.750a 0.031
Old-age benefits as a source of income in t1
No 1
Yes 4.714a 1.023
Main source of income in t1
Old-age benefitc 1
Unemployment benefit 0.121a 0.070
Social welfared 0.048a 0.021
Invalidity allowance 0.155a 0.072
Log likelihood −874.51 −841.02
LR 230.57 (df = 5) 297.54 (df = 7)
p value 0.00 0.00
McFadden’s adj. R2 0.110 0.142
Sensitivity 62.53%e 64.56%e
Specificity 68.61%e 70.44%e
Correctly classified 67.07%e 68.95%e
The sample comprised individuals aged either 50–59 (females) and 50–64 (males) or workers aged 50+; annual data for
the period 2004–2010. Sample size for both models—1749 observations
asignificant at the 1% level
bRefers to a 1 percentage point change in the negative change in the unemployment rate
cOld-age benefits—pension or retirement benefits
dSocial welfare—social benefit, non-income source, dependent
eCut-off level in the classification table 0.2533 (based on the share of the outflow in the whole sample)
Source: authors’ calculations; data sources: LFS
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those who were receiving an invalidity allowance, 8 times more than those who were
receiving unemployment benefits and 20 times more than those who were receiving so-
cial welfare benefits. These findings mean that eligibility for an old-age benefit gener-
ates a strong push out from the labour market.
The aforementioned qualitative findings are consistent with some of the results from
the SHARE analysis. Myck et al. (2014) showed that older workers and those who be-
came eligible for old-age benefits were more likely to leave the labour market. The par-
ticipation was positively related to health status, yet at the same time, health did not
significantly differentiate the timing of the outflow to inactivity.
5 Conclusions
In this study, we performed an empirical analysis of the discouraged worker effect
among older workers. We broadened the standard definition of this effect to identify to
what extent easy and early access to old-age benefits contributes to the widely observed
low participation rates among older workers. We treated old-age benefits as an alternative
source of income to remuneration—either as already available or as a forthcoming option.
We based the quantitative analysis on macroeconomic LFS data (2000–2013) and
LFS individual data (2004–2010). Being cautious in the qualitative interpretation of the
results, we drew a number of conclusions. The cyclical properties of the participation
rates varied over time. The discouraged worker effect occurred among older workers but
it appeared to vary over time. The added worker effect prevailed at first; the discouraged
worker effect arose after some delay. The effect was asymmetric in intensity and length. A
larger effect arose after a negative shock to the unemployment rate; it looks that more
people left the workforce during a recession than re-entered in an expansion. The results
indicate that workers left the workforce almost permanently. Interestingly, in the short
term, when job finding chances improved, the participation rates decreased as well.
We found that females and older workers were more likely to withdraw from the labour
market participation. Workers who received old-age benefits (and treated them as the
main source of income) were 8 to 20 times more likely to leave the workforce compared
to those who received either unemployment benefits or social welfare benefits.
Budgetary constraints and their projections are usually an argument in debates on the
retirement age and the need to raise it. However, judging from individual perspective, the
public hardly ever agrees with that need. The data do not permit us to draw strong and
robust qualitative conclusions. However, we perceive our paper as a minor contribution
to the complexity of arguments for a higher retirement age, which we understand as the
age of the availability of the old-age benefits. The benefits seem to contribute to prema-
ture withdrawal from the labour market. At the macro level, this entails an increased fiscal
burden and a welfare loss. Analysed from the labour market perspective, these benefits
paid to the very old individuals are a natural part of a social safety net, but these benefits
paid to the not-yet-old are not necessarily so needed. Premature withdrawals mean stron-
ger down pressure exerted on the net remuneration for work. The working generation
has to bear this higher cost arising from the old-age benefits’ premature eligibility. Higher
remuneration for work could be possible, if the benefits were not paid out to the not-yet-
old. The argument of potentially higher remuneration for the working generation when
old-age benefits are not paid to not-yet-old individuals goes beyond purely fiscal state-
ments and may help encourage people to stay in employment rather than retire.
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The case of the Polish labour market analysed in this paper gives additional future re-
search possibility. The pension system introduced in 1999 has not only recently started
to register individual account values but also started to transform the account values
into benefits, which takes into account individual age of retirement. This means
workers not only know but directly feel: the later the retirement the higher the benefit.
The increase in benefits with postponed retirement is actuarial. Consequently, a new
relatively strong factor enters the model. We see the need to extend the analysis in
order to directly account for the impact of old-age benefits on workers’ intentions and
preferences concerning labour market participation.
Endnotes
1Compare Benati (2001) for a literature survey on methods used in the aggregate
analyses.
2Cyclical properties of the participation rates can be disturbed if worker flows are
persistent (Clark and Summers 1982).
3O’Brien (2011) also argued that the impact of social security pension values on par-
ticipation rates was relatively small.
4By discouraged workers, Maestas and Li (2006) meant those job seekers who were
willing to work at the prevailing wage rate but were unable to find a job.
5In 2013, 44.0% as compared to, for instance, 54.8% in the Czech Republic, 67.4% in
Germany and 77.7% in Sweden.
6Prospectively, it will be 67 as the minimum age for both genders. That age is to be
achieved gradually (from the beginning of 2013 each year 3 months up from the initial
60 for women and 65 for men).
7Hazans (2007) showed how strong the effect of simultaneous work and old-age
benefit income was. He proved that once the possibility of receiving old-age benefits
simultaneously with labour income was introduced in 1996 in Estonia, the number of
economically active persons aged 65–74 almost doubled in 2003.
8The previous pension system, although put down in 1999, left numerous early re-
tirees. These are mostly women who used to retire after 30 years of employment,
miners, army and police.
9Participation rate increased from 31.7% in 2004 to 44.0% in 2013 (OECD 2015).
10That was mainly due to legislation of the Martial Law of 1981–1982. Introduction
of easily available various early retirement schemes was a kind of political mean to
“buy” social peace.
11The difference in the lower bound of the age groups (45 or 50) results from data
aggregation performed by the Central Statistical Office.
12The SHARE data produce an analogous conclusion. Moreover, health status had
only a minor impact on the decision when to leave the labour force (Myck et al. 2014).
13By the discouraged worker rate we meant the ratio of the number of discouraged
workers to the population.
14The reform increasing the retirement age came into force in 2013.
15The only difference was that p value of the α^1 in the female participation rate equa-
tion was just above 0.05.
16Gałecka-Burdziak and Pater (2016) drew analogous conclusions with respect to the
working age population.
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Mean 0.662 0.495 0.604 0.331 0.024 0.018 0.037 0.034
Median 0.658 0.495 0.599 0.334 0.023 0.017 0.037 0.033
Stand.
deviation
0.014 0.008 0.036 0.011 0.003 0.002 0.007 0.006
Monthly
autocorr.
0.884 0.933 0.940 0.890 0.773 0.742 0.856 0.866
Min 0.642 0.481 0.549 0.302 0.019 0.014 0.023 0.023
Max 0.695 0.508 0.681 0.347 0.031 0.023 0.052 0.048
No. of
observations
56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56

















Table 10 Correlation coefficients between cyclical components of male and female participation rates, male and female discouraged worker rates and lagged GDP and



















GDP−1 −0.193 0.050 −0.302 −0.193 −0.235 −0.280
a 0.159 0.068
GDP−2 −0.038 0.134 −0.141 −0.115 −0.295
a −0.337b 0.176 0.054
GDP−3 0.025 0.142 −0.032 −0.031 −0.343
b −0.382b 0.244 0.093
GDP−4 0.146 0.046 0.013 −0.070 −0.384
b −0.420c 0.323b 0.145
GDP−5 0.144 −0.026 0.076 −0.036 −0.425
c −0.451c 0.335b 0.134
GDP−6 0.066 −0.137 0.168 0.043 −0.461
c −0.475c 0.296a 0.077
GDP−7 −0.008 −0.241 0.206 0.002 −0.485
c −0.491c 0.265a 0.034
GDP−8 −0.185 −0.323 0.204 0.017 −0.514
c −0.505c 0.151 −0.089
GDP−9 −0.234 −0.289 0.287
a 0.156 −0.537c −0.508c −0.035 −0.279a
GDP−10 −0.224 −0.262 0.364
b 0.262a −0.542c −0.503c −0.153 −0.395c
GDP−11 −0.257 −0.256 0.376
b 0.304b −0.529c −0.479c −0.268a −0.500c
GDP−12 −0.260 −0.158 0.449
c 0.440c −0.484c −0.428c −0.299b −0.513c
u−1 0.219 0.249 0.446
c 0.397c 0.186 0.248 −0.174 −0.111
u−2 0.197 0.208 0.298
b 0.248 0.307b 0.364b −0.131 −0.015
u−3 0.180 0.204 0.160 0.149 0.426
c 0.474c −0.084 0.086
u−4 0.168 0.191 0.017 0.083 0.538
c 0.574c −0.036 0.184
u−5 0.168 0.172 −0.123 −0.020 0.636
c 0.661c 0.012 0.278a
u−6 0.165 0.132 −0.262
a −0.152 0.718c 0.730c 0.059 0.362b
u−7 0.163 0.106 −0.382
b −0.277a 0.780c 0.780c 0.105 0.436c
u−8 0.170 0.082 −0.447
c −0.367a 0.818c 0.804c 0.154 0.504c
u−9 0.195 0.089 −0.509
















Table 10 Correlation coefficients between cyclical components of male and female participation rates, male and female discouraged worker rates and lagged GDP and
unemployment rate computed on the basis of the HP filter estimates (Continued)
u−10 0.234 0.100 −0.575
c −0.471c 0.799c 0.755c 0.238 0.587c
u−11 0.235 0.051 −0.598
c −0.505c 0.752c 0.699c 0.248 0.580c
u−12 0.228 −0.015 −0.611
c −0.610c 0.682c 0.623c 0.239 0.545c
aSignificant at the 10% level; bsignificant at the 5% level; csignificant at the 1% level
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